UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/23115
7 October 1991
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 6 OCTOBER 1991 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 6 October 1991 from Mr. Ahmad Hussein, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq, concerning the violation of the north-west borders of Iraq by four Israeli fighter aircraft.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Abdul Amir A. AL-ANBARI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

ANNEX

Letter dated 6 October 1991 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to inform you that, on Friday 4 October 1991, at 1049 hours (local time), four Israeli F-15 fighter aircraft, coming from Syrian airspace and flying at low altitude, crossed the north-west border of Iraq, then, climbing to an altitude of between 7,000 and 9,000 metres, overflew the region of Al-Kaïm (HI, kilometre 160, to the south of H2) and the region of Al Walid, before heading at low altitude for the region of Al Nadhayem on the Iraqi-Saudi Arabian border and entering Saudi Arabian airspace at 1119 hours.

This grave violation of Iraqi airspace by Israeli fighter aircraft, which coincides with the launching of the iniquitous campaign orchestrated by well-known international circles aimed at harming Iraq, confirms the existence of a premeditated plan, in which the roles have been assigned with great precision, the object of which is to humiliate the Iraqi people and to deprive them of their free will, in flagrant violation of the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, and confirming the bellicose and expansionist character of Israel.

In informing you of this flagrant violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq, we request you to intervene and immediately to take all necessary measures to put an end to these violations, which call into question, first and foremost, the credibility of the United Nations and the role incumbent upon it of protecting the independence and territorial integrity of its Member States.

(Signed) Ahmad Hussein
The Minister for Foreign Affairs

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7 October 1991
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ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 6 OCTOBER 1991 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you that United States aircraft continue to violate Iraqi airspace, as follows:

First

1. On 2/3 October 1991: 34 sorties flown by 15 two-aircraft formations, 1 three-aircraft formation and 1 single aircraft. The sorties were for purposes of observation and provocation and were at speeds of 600 to 800 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 2,000 to 6,500 metres.

2. Air activity was centred over Mosul, Dohuk, Amadiyah, Rawanduz, Zakho and Tall Afar.

3. At 1635 hours two F-16 aircraft flew over Farnas airport at a very low altitude and at a high speed; at the same time an F-16 aircraft flew over Faruk airport at an altitude of 500 metres and at a speed of 700 kilometres per hour.

Secondly

1. On 3/4 October 1991: 16 sorties flown in eight formations. The sorties were for purposes of observation and provocation and were flown at speeds of 600 to 800 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 2,000 to 6,500 metres.

2. Air activity ws concentrated over Dohuk, Zakho, Arbil, Rawanduz, Mosul, Amadiyah and Ain Zala.

Thirdly

1. On 4/5 October 1991: 24 sorties flown by 12 formations at speeds of 750 to 850 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 3,000 to 8,000 metres. Sorties were for purposes of observation and provocation and air activity was centred over Mosul, Arbil, Dohuk, Amadiyah, Zakho and Rawanduz.

2. At 1545 and 1655 hours two F-16 aircraft flew over Faruk airport at an altitude of 500 metres and a speed of 600 kilometres per hour.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Abdul Amir A. AL-ANBARI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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General Assembly Security Council

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A/46/531
S/23117
7 October 1991

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-sixth session
Agenda item 68
REVIEW OF THE IMPLEMENTATION
OF THE DECLARATION ON THE
STRENGTHENING OF INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-sixth year

Letter dated 7 October 1991 from the Permanent Representative of Bulgaria to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a declaration by the Government of the Republic of Bulgaria in connection with the escalation of the conflict in Yugoslavia. I would very much appreciate it if you would have the text of the present letter and the attached declaration circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 68, and the Security Council.

(Signed) Svetlomir BAEV
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

Declaration issued by the Government of Bulgaria

The Government of the Republic of Bulgaria follows with great concern the escalation of the meaningless and bloody conflict in neighbouring Yugoslavia.

The Bulgarian Government considers the use of military force for solving disputed issues and for redrawing the internal borders between the republics to be totally unacceptable. The joint operations of volunteer units, armed by the Republic of Serbia, and the Yugoslav People's Army in the territory of the Republic of Croatia, as well as the attempts deliberately to involve Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Macedonia in the conflict under the pretext of an all-out civil war and an impending military threat, are particularly alarming. Under that pretext, on 3 October of this year, part of the Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia took over the functions of the Federal Skupshtina (Parliament) and the collective Government of the Federation. This act amounted essentially to a military coup, excluding the possibility of solving disputes by political means.

The Republic of Bulgaria once again reiterates its position of non-interference in Yugoslavia's internal affairs, and states that it has no intention of benefiting in any way from the grave situation in that country.

At the same time, the Government categorically rejects the insinuations about some military threat or territorial claims on the part of the Republic of Bulgaria.

The Government of the Republic of Bulgaria fully supports Security Council resolution 713 (1991) on the termination of fighting and the peaceful settlement of the crisis in Yugoslavia, and of the efforts to that end by the European Community and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in particular.

As a neighbouring country to Yugoslavia, Bulgaria is vitally interested in an early and lasting restoration of peace and stability in tht country. The Bulgarian people sincerely aspires for friendly relations and all-round cooperation with all the peoples of Yugoslavia, based on mutual respect, goodwill and confidence. In evidence of this, the Government of the Republic of Bulgaria stands ready to receive international observers from the European Community and other European organizations, and to grant to military attachés, foreign journalists and envoys access to the areas along the Bulgarian-Yugoslav border, in order that any suspicion about an alleged "Bulgarian threat" may be dispersed.

The Government of the Republic of Bulgaria calls upon all forces involved in the conflict to stop the fighting and embrace political dialogue as the only viable alternative.

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Security Council

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GENERAL

S/23118
7 October 1991

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 7 OCTOBER 1991 FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The members of the Security Council have carried out the review, in informal consultations held on 7 October 1991, in accordance with the provisions of resolution 689 (1991), regarding the question of termination or continuation of the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission, as well as of its modalities, in the light of your report (S/23106 and Add.1).

I have the honour to inform you that the members concur with your recommendation, particularly in paragraph 30 of your report.

(Signed) Chinmaya Rajaninath GHAREKHAN
President of the Security Council

91-32857 2674h (E)

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/23119
7 October 1991

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 4 OCTOBER 1991 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF BRUNEI DARUSSALAM TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Permanent Representative of Brunei Darussalam to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and, with reference to the latter's note SCPC/7/91 (4-1) dated 3 July 1991, has the honour to convey that as a member of the United Nations, Brunei Darussalam continues to abide by the United Nations resolution regarding the imposition of sanctions on Iraq.

The Permanent Representative has the further honour to inform that there has been no contact in the form of flows and transfers of military weapons and equipment between the Governments of Brunei Darussalam and Iraq. Brunei Darussalam's lead agency has been informed of the mandatory nature of the United Nations Security Council resolutions concerning the commitment of the Member States to the prohibition to sell, supply or convey weapons or other military equipment as well as technology and services which can be used by Iraq for military purposes.

91-32863 2770d (E)

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Security Council

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S/23120
7 October 1991
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 7 OCTOBER 1991 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you that United States aircraft have continued to violate Iraqi airspace, as follows:

1. On 5/6 October 1991: seven sorties carried out by three two-aircraft formations and one single aircraft flying at speeds between 600 and 750 kilometres per hour and at various altitudes.

2. This air activity was for purposes of surveillance and provocation and was centred over Mosul, Arbil, Dohuk, Tall Afar, Amadiyah and Rawanduz.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Abdul Amir A. AL-ANBARI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

91-32869 2737j (E)

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/23121
8 October 1991

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON HIS MISSION OF GOOD OFFICES IN CYPRUS

1. The present report on my mission of good offices concerning Cyprus is being submitted pursuant to the request by the members of the Security Council to provide a full report by the end of August on the substance of the ideas that were discussed and the responses of all concerned, and to provide my assessment of the situation, particularly with regard to whether the conditions are conducive to a successful outcome of a high-level international meeting (S/22744). As the members of the Council are aware, I postponed my presentation of this report until the completion of the two rounds of talks between my representatives and the two parties in Cyprus and Greece and Turkey.

2. In my oral statement of 27 June 1991 to the Security Council, I referred to the discussions that had taken place since the latter part of 1990 with the leaders of the two communities as well as with a senior official of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I recalled that the purpose of those discussions had been to explore ideas that could bring the two sides within agreement range on each of the eight headings of the outline of an overall agreement. I expressed the view that as a result of those discussions clarifications had emerged that should make it possible to advance under a number of headings, notably overall objectives of the agreement, guiding principles of the federation and security and guarantee. I also noted that several headings remained to be dealt with, notably territorial adjustments and displaced persons. I concluded that if it was possible to move forward on the outstanding headings an agreed outline should be within reach.

3. As I informed the Security Council, as part of my effort to find a way to move forward, I had a telephone conversation with President Ozal of Turkey towards the end of May. He told me that after reviewing the outcome of recent talks he was of the view that a meeting of the leaders of the two communities, Greece and Turkey, under my chairmanship could give new and strong impetus to my efforts and help the two sides reach agreement on an outline of an overall agreement. In my statement of 27 June, I informed the Council that I was attracted by the idea of a high-level international meeting that would result in an agreed outline provided it was thoroughly prepared to ensure its success. To that end, I proposed that my representatives undertake two rounds of discussions with all concerned in July and August to work out a set of

ideas that would bring the two sides within agreement range on all of the headings. I proposed to review the situation at the conclusion of the second round at the end of August to assess whether the conditions were ripe to proceed to a high-level meeting and to consult the Council accordingly. That approach was endorsed by the members of the Council in the statement issued by its President on 28 June 1991 (S/22744).

4. During my visit to Turkey in early July, I discussed the Cyprus problem and my approach for proceeding with Prime Minister Yilmaz and President Ozal on 7 and 8 July respectively. Both the President and the Prime Minister agreed that it was important to make a strong and renewed effort during the remainder of my mandate and they assured me of their desire to help me in this endeavour.

5. During a visit to Greece and Turkey in mid-July, President Bush of the United States of America spoke with Prime Minister Mitsotakis, President Ozal and Prime Minister Yilmaz in support of my mission of good offices on Cyprus. On 2 August, it was announced that Greece and Turkey had agreed to attend a well-prepared meeting concerning Cyprus chaired by the Secretary-General and that the Greek and Turkish leaders would work in support of the Secretary-General's efforts to narrow the differences in advance of such a meeting, which was planned for September, provided adequate progress was made. On 5 August, I made a public statement welcoming the personal effort by President Bush in support of my mission of good offices and the commitment of the Greek and Turkish leaders to help me make progress in advance of a high-level meeting.

6. As the members of the Security Council will recall, during the second half of 1990 and the first quarter of 1991 my representatives had a number of separate meetings with the leaders of the two communities and their representatives to explore elements of an outline of an overall agreement. In addition, between October 1990 and February 1991, one of my representatives had a series of discussions with a senior official of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This process proved helpful in putting together an initial set of ideas and provided the starting point for the discussions during the summer.

7. During the first round, my representatives met with senior Turkish and Greek officials at Ankara from 23 to 26 July and at Athens on 27 and 28 July respectively, and separately with the two leaders at Nicosia from 29 July to 3 August. They presented ideas for each of the headings (except transitional arrangements), taking into account the above-mentioned previous discussions and attempting to respond to the legitimate interests and reasonable concerns of both parties. In areas where during the previous discussions the two sides appeared to be relatively close, the ideas were elaborated fully. This was particularly the case for the overall objectives of an agreement, the guiding principles of the federation, the powers and functions of the federal government, the federal legislature, the federal judiciary, and security and guarantee. In areas that had not yet been adequately discussed, a variety of options were presented to stimulate discussion. I am referring in particular to displaced persons, the federal executive and territorial adjustments.

8. During the first round, the complete text of the ideas was discussed fully at Ankara, Athens and separately with the two sides in Cyprus. In Nicosia, my representatives also informed the two sides of their respective reactions to the various ideas. The objective of that process was not to obtain their approval but to seek their reactions and suggestions on the basis of which those ideas would be further elaborated and amended for the second round of talks.

9. During the first half of August, the ideas were revised in the light of the previous discussions. Concrete ideas were elaborated in the areas that had previously contained options (displaced persons, territorial adjustments and the federal executive). In addition, ideas on transitional arrangements and goodwill measures that would be implemented during the transitional period were also prepared.

10. The objective of the second round of talks was to seek broad agreement of the two sides to a set of ideas that would bring them within agreement range and thereby make possible a high-level international meeting.

11. My representatives began the second round of talks on 17 August at Athens, where they reviewed the outcome of the July talks and the most recent text of ideas with Foreign Minister Samaras and other senior officials of the Ministry. The Minister indicated that he was encouraged with the way the talks were proceeding and expressed the hope that the high-level meeting could be held in September as tentatively planned.

12. They then had meetings at Ankara from 21 to 24 August. In addition to reviewing the situation with Foreign Minister Giray, they had intensive discussions with senior Foreign Ministry officials during which they considered in detail the text of the ideas covering each of the eight headings of the agreement. The Turkish officials reiterated their desire to work in support of my effort and their wish that the high-level meeting take place in September. These discussions proved most helpful in refining the text of the ideas. At the conclusion of the talks, it was apparent that, although the two sides in Cyprus remained apart on some issues and the territorial adjustments still had to be further defined, the revised text of ideas that had emerged from the talks at Ankara represented an important step forward which should provide the basis on which an agreement could be worked out.

13. On 26 August, my representatives stopped over at Athens to meet Prime Minister Mitsotakis, with whom they reviewed the ideas that would be discussed with the two sides in Cyprus. The Prime Minister conveyed his full support of my effort.

14. My representatives had separate meetings with the leaders of the two communities in Cyprus from 26 to 29 August and again from 7 to 14 September, during which they presented to the two leaders the full text of the ideas on each of the eight headings and accompanying goodwill measures and elicited their views.

15. Both leaders agreed that in view of the comprehensive manner in which the ideas had been elaborated it would be possible to omit the preparation of an outline of an agreement and to proceed directly to completing an overall framework agreement. In addition, it was agreed that the preparation of the agreement should be essentially completed to the satisfaction of both sides before convening the high-level meeting. These understandings had also been endorsed by Greece and Turkey.

16. President Vassiliou's reaction to the ideas revealed that although differences remained to be resolved on a number of issues, the set of ideas as a whole provided the basis for working out an overall framework agreement.

17. In the course of the discussions with His Excellency Mr. Denktaş, he stated that each side possessed sovereignty which it would retain after the establishment of a federation, including the right of secession, and sought extensive changes in the text of the ideas that were discussed.

Observations

18. As I had reminded the two leaders in my statement of 2 March 1990 (see S/21183, annex II), in paragraph 1 of resolution 367 (1975) the Security Council had called upon all States and the parties concerned to refrain from any action that might prejudice the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus, as well as from any attempt at partition of the island or its unification with any other country. In drawing up the mandate of the Secretary-General's mission of good offices on Cyprus, the Security Council thus posited a solution based on the existence of one State of Cyprus comprising two communities.

19. Consequently, the introduction of the concept referred to in paragraph 17 would in this context fundamentally alter the nature of the solution provided for in the 1977 and 1979 high-level agreements and which the Security Council has consistently foreseen, most recently in resolution 649 (1990).

20. Deriving from the position of the Security Council, which it has reiterated in successive resolutions, the 1977 and 1979 high-level agreements between the two parties in Cyprus and the understandings accepted by both sides (see S/21393, para. 12), the objective of my mission of good offices has been to preserve the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the State of Cyprus; and to establish a new constitutional arrangement for the State of Cyprus that would regulate the relations of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities on a federal, bi-communal and bi-zonal basis. Each community has been participating in this process on an equal footing and will have the opportunity to express separately its consent to the arrangements reached.

21. The developments of the past few months had raised justifiable expectations that significant progress would be made and that a high-level meeting would take place in September to conclude an overall framework

agreement. The set of ideas that my representatives brought to Cyprus at the end of August represent an important step forward which must be preserved and used as the basis for completing the overall framework agreement.

22. It is important that the expectations that were raised over the past few months not be lost. This requires that we proceed without delay to conclude the preparatory work and to convene the high-level meeting. I will therefore request my representatives to resume in early November their discussions with the two sides in Cyprus and Greece and Turkey to finalize the set of ideas . If this effort can proceed in keeping with the basic principles adopted by the Security Council and accepted by the two sides in the 1977 and 1979 high-level agreements, I am confident that it will be possible to convene the high-level meeting before the end of this year.

23. At the same time, I must again appeal to both sides to refrain from making statements or taking actions that are counter-productive and only make our effort to find a solution more difficult.

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S/23122
8 October 1991

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the members of the Security Council the attached communication which he has received from the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

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available

Annex

Letter dated 3 October 1991 from the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency addressed to the Secretary-General

Please find attached the first report of the sixth IAEA inspection in Iraq under Security Council resolution 687 (1991). You may deem it appropriate to transmit the report to the members of the Security Council. I remain, of course, available with the Chief Inspector, Mr. David Kay, for any consultations you or the Council may wish to have.

(Signed) Hans BLIX

Enclosure

First report on the sixth IAEA on-site inspection in Iraq under Security Council resolution 687 (1991)

22-30 September 1991

Introduction

1. The following report is based on a field analysis of documents obtained, photographed or seen during inspections of Iraqi establishments visited by the sixth IAEA inspection team. Most of the important documents were obtained, photographed or seen during visits to two establishments, the Nuclear Design Center and Petrochemical Three (PC-3) Headquarters, on 23 and 24 September 1991 respectively. The Appendix provides a chronology of activities.

2. The documents obtained or photographed by the team are for the greater part in Arabic, and there has been limited time for scanning. Only a few documents - although some very important ones - have so far been completely translated. Accordingly, a follow-up report will be issued after a thorough analysis of all the documentary material removed from Iraq.

Summary

3. The sixth IAEA inspection team obtained conclusive evidence that the Government of Iraq had a program for developing an implosion-type nuclear weapon, and it found documents linking this program - code-named "Petrochemical Three" (PC-3) - to Iraq's Ministry of Industry and Military Industrialization, the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) and Iraq's Ministry of Defense. Documents were found showing that the nuclear weapons program was supported by broad-based international procurement efforts. Contrary to Iraq's claims of having only a peaceful nuclear program, the team found documents showing that Iraq had been working on the revision of a nuclear weapons design and one linking the IAEC to work on a surface-to-surface missile project - presumably the intended delivery system for their nuclear weapon.

PC-3 reports on Al Atheer

4. On the basis largely of top-secret progress reports found on 23 September 1991, the team concludes that Iraq was engaged in a broad-based effort to design and develop an implosion-type nuclear weapon. The documents, which cover a period up to 31 May 1990, describe nuclear weapons development experiments involving - for example - neutron

neutron initiators, enriched-uranium cores, reflectors, high-explosive lenses and electronic firing sets. One document points to Iraqi success in the machining of nuclear weapons components from natural uranium, but it is not clear from the document whether Iraq had enough highly enriched uranium for an actual explosive device.

5. One document links the Al Qa Qaa High Explosives and Propellant Facility to the program. Even more importantly, it shows clearly that nuclear weapons design work was conducted at Al Atheer - a facility which Iraq claims to have had no nuclear connection. A top-secret report states that the objective of the Al Atheer facility was to design and produce a nuclear device. Previous teams carrying out inspections under Security Council resolution 687 concluded that the Al Atheer facility was most probably to be used for nuclear weapons component production, high-explosive experiments and device assembly.

6. The inspection team also found evidence of Iraqi work on sophisticated computer codes used in the development of nuclear weapons, including one- and two-dimensional hydrodynamic and neutronic models which simulate the behaviour of nuclear weapons as they are being fired. Some of these sophisticated codes had been modified by Iraq before being used at Al Atheer. The document states that, as of June 1990, the basic design for Iraq's nuclear explosives device had gone through five modifications.

Additional evidence of intention to develop nuclear weapons

7. The reports on Al Atheer appear to be the most important of those found in four boxes full of classified Iraqi papers.[1/] The team also found a document suggesting the parallel development of a missile delivery system for the ongoing nuclear weapons program. In the document, the Ministry of Defense instructed the IAEC to postpone an experiment until after surface-to-surface missile testing.

8. Other documents contain evidence that since 1981 Iraq intended to produce enriched uranium by methods other than electromagnetic isotope separation. Specifically, the documents showed that Iraq explored gaseous diffusion and centrifuge enrichment techniques as late as 1988 and as early as 1982, respectively. The documents included an IAEC-accredited study in the field of nuclear implosion physics –another clear indication of nuclear weapons development intentions.

1/ It should be recalled, however, that the Government of Iraq seized these boxes from the inspection team on 23 September and has still not returned all of the documents which were in them. Notes by the team on some of these documents indicate that they contained additional information on the Iraqi nuclear weapons program.

Procurement activities

9. On the basis of documents seen during the inspection, the team believes that Iraq conducted substantial nuclear-weapons-related procurement from foreign sources. Catalogues from numerous suppliers were found at the PC-3 Headquarters, many of them translated into Arabic. However, because of the team's hasty exit from this establishment before being detained in a parking lot, much information was lost. Although - as just indicated - the team believes that the procurement in question was in support of the nuclear weapons program, it must be stressed that most items will probably prove to have been innocuous, multi-use items for which export licences were not needed and/or which were dispatched before imposition of the United Nations trade embargo.

10. From the documents seen it is evident that Iraq drew up lists of approved suppliers whose products would meet the program's technical specifications. On-site inspections of procured equipment and material have already shown that items supplied to the IAEC came from many countries.

11. The team found evidence that, realizing that large-scale purchasing abroad could attract outside attention, the Iraqi authorities devised cover explanations for purchases. In this connection, a country-wide survey of the types and amounts of the equipment required for the civilian sector was recommended, the idea being that indigenously produced items should be used in the civilian sector, while high-quality imported items bearing the same general descriptions would be used for the clandestine nuclear weapons program.

12. The team noted that the procurement of machinery had often been coupled with relevant on-the-spot training of Iraqi engineers by the manufacturer. In the case of machinery such as lathes and milling machines, test pieces had sometimes been ordered for the validation of technical specifications and computer numerical control software had sometimes been obtained.

13. At the PC-3 Headquarters, the team found many volumes of documents related to procurement for the Iraqi nuclear weapons program. A number of cover names used by Iraq in its procurement activities have been identified, and it is expected that this number will grow as further procurement records are translated.

Administration of the nuclear weapons program

14. From the documentation seen by it, the team concluded that the Iraqi nuclear weapons program was under the general control of the Ministry of Industry and Military Industrialization, with specific control assigned to PC-3. The team found numerous classified

communications with the IAEC heading and a sub-heading identifying PC-3, which confirms that some part of the IAEC was involved in the nuclear weapons program. In this connection it should be noted that the IAEC collaborated with the Iraqi Ministry of Defense on defense-related projects. The team has compiled a list of project activities to be followed up in the future.

15. The PC-3 employee lists show that Dr. Jaffar Dhia Jaffar was a senior administrator for the program. Similar documentation shows that Dr. Jaffar was intimately linked to the uranium enrichment program. The team accordingly believes that Dr. Jaffar had the lead technical and administrative responsibility for the nuclear weapons program as a whole - despite his repeated claims that no such program existed.

Iraq's obstructing of inspectors

16. Despite the success of the team in obtaining sensitive, classified documentation on Iraq's nuclear weapons program, one may never discover the true extent of that program. This is due partly to the fact that the Iraqi authorities confiscated documents collected on the first inspection day, despite strong protests by the team's Chief Inspector and the representative of the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM). Furthermore, it was obvious after reviewing the material returned to the team that some documents were missing. The team believes that, during the period of nearly seven hours before the return of the documents, the Iraqi authorities reviewed them, withholding the most sensitive ones. Although there might be other explanations, in the light of the continued attempts to conceal the true extent of Iraq's nuclear weapons program and of some very recent correspondence relevant to the programme found at one site, the question remains open whether Iraq has given up its nuclear weapons aspirations.

Continuing Iraqi non-compliance with Security Council resolutions

17. On the basis of the above, it is concluded that the documents found by the team clearly demonstrate that the Government of Iraq is in violation of Security Council resolutions 687 and 707. This is underscored by the fact that Iraq detained the inspectors and confiscated documents which had been legitimately collected.

18. Specifically, the following maybe noted:

- Iraq had - despite its statements to the contrary - a complex, comprehensive nuclear weapons development program characterized by parallel approaches to fissile material production and by theoretical/experimental design work

- Iraq still has substantial facilities which were part of the clandestine program and which have not been declared.

- Iraq has removed significant documentary material and equipment from identified nuclear program sites - including some documentary material removed shortly before the arrival of the team.

19. Iraq has violated the privileges and immunities to which the inspectors were entitled:

- it detained the team for five hours on the first inspection day,

- it confiscated all documents collected by the team during the first inspection visit,

- it interrupted access to the second inspection site before the team had completed its work,

- it detained the team for 96 hours in the parking lot next to the second inspection site,

- it opened official mail addressed to the team's Chief Inspector and to the UNSCOM representative.

20. From the evidence which the team has obtained and from the treatment of the team it is concluded that there was repeated and wilful non-compliance with Security Council resolutions 687 and 707 and violation of the UN/IAEA-specified privileges and immunities agreed to by the Government of Iraq.

Appendix

Chronology of Team Activities

The following is a general chronology of the activities of the 6th IAEA nuclear inspection team:

Date	Time	Activity
91/09/22	1000	Arrive Baghdad from Bahrain
91/09/23	0559	Arrive at first inspection site - the Nuclear Design Center
91/09/23	1006	Four boxes of classified IAEC documents found in basement of Nuclear Design Center
91/09/23	1545	Team attempts to depart first site
91/09/23	1600	First deadline for letting team depart site expires
91/09/23	1630	Iraqi authorities begin to review documents removed by team
91/09/23	1825	Dr. Jaffar arrives and demands a list of all documents
91/09/23	1830	Second deadline given by Chief Inspector to grant release of team expires
91/09/23	1900	Iraqi authorities confiscate documents collected by the team as the inspectors prepare to leave the facility
91/09/24	0200	Iraqi authorities return most, but not all - of the documents collected at the Nuclear Design Center
91/09/24	0620	Arrive at second inspection site, the Headquarters of the Petrochemical Three program
91/09/24	1050	Iraqi authorities demand that all work stop and that the team leave immediately
91/09/24	1230	Dr. Jaffar arrives and demands all documents and film. Stalemate ensues
91/09/27	1530	During continued detainment of the team, a fire is noted on the top floor of one of the two target buildings
91/09/28	0546	Team is released from parking lot and returns to hotel
91/09/28	0800-1900	IAEA-Iraqi inventory and review of documents collected from second inspection site

91/09/29	0730	Depart for final day of inspections
91/09/29	0800-0830	Search of warehouse for documents
91/09/29	0930-1300	Search of the IAEC Training Center
91/09/29	1330-1830	Search of the Reactor Siting and Planning Building
91/09/29	1630-1700	Search of grounds of Meeting House
91/09/30	1230	Depart Iraq for Bahrain

Annex to the First Report on the On-site Inspection
in Iraq under Security Council resolution 687 (1991)
22 - 30 September 1991

IMPORTANT NOTICE

This Annex is a translation from Arabic of an Iraqi report found by the 6th Agency inspection team on Monday, 23 September 1991 during an inspection in an Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission building in dowtown Baghdad. Its title is

"Al-Athir [Al-Atheer] Plant Progress Report
for the period 1 January 1990 to 31 May 1990"

((BEGIN TEXT))

1/17

((COVER PAGE))

TOP SECRET - 5 ((SIC)) REPRODUCTION FORBIDDEN

MINISTRY OF INDUSTRY AND INDUSTRIALIZATION
PETROCHEMICAL PROJECT
3

((END COVER PAGE))

((PAGE 2))
MINISTRY OF INDUSTRY AND INDUSTRIALIZATION
PETROCHEMICAL PROJECT -3-

TITLE: AL-ATHIR PLANT PROGRESS REPORT FOR THE PERIOD FROM 1 JANUARY 1990 TO 31 MAY 1990

PREPARED BY: HEADQUARTERS, AL-ATHIR PLANT OFFICE

((MOSLEM DATE EQUIVALENT WRITTEN IN LONGHAND))

((END PAGE 2))

((PAGE 3))

THE REPUBLIC OF IRAQ

MINISTRY OF INDUSTRY AND MILITARY INDUSTRIALIZATION
AL-ATHIR PLANT

NUMBER: 1723/697
DATE: 17/11/1410 ((MOSLEM CALENDAR))
DATE: 11 NOVEMBER 1990

TOP SECRET

TO: DOCTOR NU'MAN SA'D-AL DIN AL-NU 'AIMI
SUBJECT: PROGRESS REPORT

REFERENCE YOUR LETTER NUMBER M/N 14 DATED 27 MAY 1990.

WE ENCLOSE HEREWITH A PROGRESS REPORT FOR THE AL-ATHIR PLANT FOR 1 JANUARY 1990 TO 31 MAY 1990.

PLEASE NOTE AND TAKE NECESSARY MEASURES. REGARDS.

HIKMAT NU'AIM AL-HILU ((OR JILU?))
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR GENERAL
9 JUNE 1990

COPY TO: DIRECTOR GENERAL. PLEASE NOTE. REGARDS.

((END PAGE 3))

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2/17

((PAGE 4))

ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE AL-ATHIR PLANT
FOR THE PERIOD
1 JANUARY 1990 TO 31 MAY 1990

((END PAGE 4))

((PAGE 5))

CONTENTS

	PAGE
THEORETICAL CALCULATIONS	2
PRODUCTION OF MATERIALS	5
PRODUCTION OF POLONIUM-210	
PRODUCTION OF PLUTONIUM	
PRODUCTION OF NATURAL URANIUM METAL	
PRODUCTION OF ENRICHED URANIUM METAL	
PRODUCTION OF YELLOW CERIUM SULPHIDE	
MATERIALS PROGRAMS	8
TESTS	10
DETONATION TESTS	
NEUTRONIC TEST	
NUCLEAR INITIATION	
FLASH X-RAY	
FIRING SYSTEMS, CONTROL AND GUIDANCE	12
SYNCHRONIZATION AND TIMING SYSTEMS	
PULSE POWER EQUIPMENT	
CHARGING POWER EQUIPMENT	
JUNCTION SWITCHES	
CAPACITOR	
MEASUREMENTS	
SUPPORT ACTIVITIES	14
TRANSFER TO NEW WORK SITE (AL-ATHIR PLANT)	14

((END PAGE 5))

3/17

SECRET

((PAGE 6 TO END))

AL-ATHIR PLANT PROGRESS REPORT FOR THE PERIOD
1 JANUARY 1990 TO 31 MAY 1990

THE GOAL OF THE AL-ATHIR PLANT PROGRAM IS THE DESIGN AND MANUFACTURE OF THE MECHANISM WHICH IS COMPOSED OF THE FOLLOWING PRINCIPAL PARTS:

NUCLEAR INITIATOR (POLONIUM-210 METAL/BERYLLIUM)
CORE (ENRICHED URANIUM METAL)
REFLECTOR (NATURAL URANIUM METAL)
TAMPER (HARDENED IRON)
EXPLOSIVE LENSES (PREPARED BY THE AL-QA' QA' GENERAL ESTABLISHMENT)
ELECTRONIC SYSTEMS (TRIGGERING, CONTROL AND GUIDANCE)

DURING THIS PERIOD A NUMBER OF ACCOMPLISHMENTS WERE ACHIEVED ON BOTH THE THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL LEVEL. IN LIGHT OF THESE RESULTS, PREPARATIONS ARE UNDERWAY TO UPDATE THE BASIC DESIGN OF THE MECHANISM (FIFTH UPDATE) WHICH INCLUDES VARIOUS OPTIONS AND THE PREFERRED OPTION. THESE RESULTS CAN BE SUMMARIZED AS FOLLOWS:

THEORETICAL CALCULATIONS:

THE THEORETICAL CALCULATIONS ARE AIMED AT COMING UP WITH DESIGNS FOR THE IMPLOSION MECHANISM. IN ORDER TO ACCOMPLISH THIS MISSION THERE MUST BE A CLEAR AND PRECISE UNDERSTANDING OF MULTIPLE ASPECTS OF PHYSICS. THERE ALSO MUST BE A SET OF INTEGRATED CALCULATIONS FOR CONVERTING THE THEORETICAL CONCEPT INTO A PRACTICAL REALITY THROUGH COMPUTATIONS AND DESIGNS WHICH CAN BE APPLIED. THESE INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING:

1. IN THE AREA OF GENERATING THEORETICAL EQUATIONS OF STATE, A GENERAL EQUATION OF STATE WAS DERIVED WHICH USED THE "BARNES" (?) MODEL FOR PRESSURE COMBINED WITH THE THOMAS-FERMI-DIRAC MODEL UNDER HIGH PRESSURE. THIS

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EQUATION OF STATE WAS COMPARED WITH ANOTHER ANALYTICAL EQUATION AND THE RESULTS SHOWED THAT THE "BARNES" EQUATION OF STATE IS CLOSER TO PRACTICAL RESULTS FOR URANIUM. THERE IS ALSO A CORRELATION BETWEEN THE TWO EQUATIONS IN A HIGH PRESSURE REGIME.

2. IN THE AREA OF THEORETICAL MODELS, A PLIANT-FLEXIBLE BEHAVIOR AND MODEL FOR STRESSES WERE INSERTED INTO THE COMPUTATION, WHICH SOLVED THE ONE-DIMENSIONAL HYDRODYNAMIC EQUATIONS.

3. IN THE AREA OF TWO-DIMENSIONAL HYDRODYNAMIC PROGRAMS, PROGRAMS WERE DEVELOPED WHICH SOLVED THE TWO-DIMENSIONAL HYDRODYNAMIC EQUATIONS IN ORDER TO TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THE DEVELOPMENT OF DISTORTIONS OVER A PERIOD OF TIME. THIS NEW POSSIBILITY OF THE PROGRAM WAS TESTED IN EXPERIMENTS USING FLYING METAL PLATES TO STUDY THE EFFECT OF ELASTICITY AND FLEXIBILITY ON THE WAY IN WHICH DISTORTIONS GROW, AS WELL AS THE EFFECT OF OTHER RELEVANT FACTORS PREPARATORY TO USING THE SAME CONCEPTS IN A STUDY OF SPHERICAL SYSTEMS AND DESIGN OPTIONS. THESE PROGRAMS WERE USED IN AN INITIAL STUDY OF THE STABILITY OF SOME DESIGN OPTIONS PREPARATORY TO STUDY OF THIS SUBJECT IN A MORE DETAILED MANNER. IN THE SAME AREA, A LOCAL PROGRAM WAS COMPLETED WHICH SOLVED THE TWO-DIMENSIONAL HYDRODYNAMIC EQUATIONS AND SOME INITIAL TESTS WERE CONDUCTED ON IT. TESTS ARE NOW BEING CONDUCTED UNDER CONDITIONS IN WHICH THE ((PROGRAM'S)) EFFECTIVENESS IS MORE DIFFICULT TO CONFIRM.

4. IN THE AREA OF COMBINED HYDRODYNAMIC-NEUTRONIC PROGRAMS AND CALCULATIONS, A PROGRAM WAS DEVELOPED SO THAT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO CALCULATE A NUMBER OF NEUTRONIC GENERATIONS WHICH ARE PRODUCED WHEN LARGE AMOUNTS OF ENERGY ARE LIBERATED FROM THE SYSTEMS WHOSE TOTAL ENERGY HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN CALCULATED BY USING THE SAME PROGRAMS. TWO COMPUTATIONS WERE ALSO COMPLETED WHICH CARRIED OUT THE COMBINED HYDRODYNAMIC-NEUTRONIC CALCULATIONS. BOTH PROGRAMS USE A HYDRODYNAMIC PROGRAM WHICH HAD BEEN WRITTEN LOCALLY AND WHICH RELIED ON A WELL-KNOWN METHOD IN SOLVING HYDRODYNAMIC EQUATIONS. BY USING THESE INTER-RELATED PROGRAMME,

VARIOUS CALCULATIONS WERE CARRIED OUT FOR SEVERAL PROPOSED SYSTEMS.

5. IN THE AREA OF THE FLYING PLATES AND THEIR USE IN INCREASING THE PRESSURE WAVE, A STUDY OF THE EVEN SHOCK WAVE WAS CONDUCTED ON THESE PLATES BOTH WITH A LAYER OF EXPLOSIVES AND WITHOUT THIS LAYER. THE RESULT SHOWED GOOD AGREEMENT WITH SOME OF THE PRACTICAL RESULTS WHICH HAD BEEN PUBLISHED FOR AMUMINIUM AND ESPECIALLY IN REGARD TO THE FREE SURFACE VELOCITY AND OBTAINING FISSURES IN THESE FLYING PLATES. THIS WAS PREPARATORY TO CONDUCTING SIMILAR STUDIES ON HOW TO USE THE SPHERICAL FLYING PLATES TO ENLARGE THE PRESSURE WAVE.

6. IN THE AREA OF USING THE LINEAR THEORY OF DISTURBANCE TO STUDY AND CALCULATE THE GROWTH OF DISTORTIONS IN PARTS OF THE MECHANISM OVER A PERIOD OF TIME AS WELL AS THE STABILITY OF THE SPHERICAL SHOCK WAVE, AN INITIAL PROGRAM WAS CONSTRUCTED WHICH SOLVED THE ONE-DIMENSIONAL HYDRODYNAMIC EQUATIONS; THIS PROGRAM WAS COMBINED WITH ANOTHER PROGRAM WHICH USED THE LINEAR DISTURBANCE THEORY EQUATIONS. SOME TESTS WERE PERFORMED ON THIS PROGRAM TO CONFIRM ITS VALIDITY. THESE TESTS INDICATED THE PRESENCE OF SOME DIFFICULTIES AT THE BEGINNING, BUT THESE WERE OVERCOME FOLLOWING CONCENTRATED EFFORTS. WORK IS NOW UNDERWAY TO DEVELOP THIS PROGRAM.

7. IN THE AREA OF MOLECULAR DYNAMICS, A ONE-DIMENSIONAL COMPUTATION WAS DEVELOPED AS AN INITAIL PHASE AND IT IS CURRENTLY BEING APPLIED TO CARRY OUT SOME PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE CALCULATIONS TO CONFIRM ITS VALIDITY.

8. IN THE AREA OF RESEARCHING THE LITERATURE, A NUMBER ((OF ARTICLES)) OF SPECIFIC IMPORTANCE WERE IDENTIFIED, THEORETICAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE SUBJECT WAS INCREASED THROUGH EXHAUSTIVE STUDY AND A NUMBER OF THE SCIENTIFIC COMPUTATIONS WERE AFFECTED WHICH MOVED THE WORK AHEAD, SUCH AS THE HYDRODYNAMIC PROGRAM, WHICH SOLVED THE ONE-DIMENSIONAL HYDRODYNAMIC EQUATIONS WITH RADIATION TRANSPORT AS WELL AS THE NEUTRONIC PROGRAM

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6/17

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WHICH SOLVED THE NEUTRON TRANSPORT EQUATION THROUGH THE MONTE CARLO METHOD. THESE PROGRAMS WERE COMPLETED AND THEY WERE INSERTED INTO THE COMPUTER. CONCENTRATED ATTEMPTS ARE NOW UNDERWAY TO RUN THEM IN PREPARATION TO TESTING THEM AND DEVELOPING THEM IN THE DIRECTION WHICH WOULD HELP MOVE THE THEORETICAL WORK FORWARD AND FACILITATE THE ANSWERING OF A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS.

9. THE THEORETICAL UNDERSTANDING WAS UTILIZED AND THE COMPUTATION WAS USED WHICH HAD BEEN PREVIOUSLY CONSTRUCTED TO UPDATE THE BASIC REPORT. THIS INCLUDED HYDRODYNAMIC AND COMBINED HYDRODYNAMIC-NEUTRONIC CALCULATIONS WHICH USE THE LATEST THEORETICAL INFORMATION AVAILABLE REGARDING EQUATION OF STATE.

PRODUCTION OF MATERIAL:

1. PRODUCTION OF POLONIUM-210

POLONIUM-210 IS CONSIDERED ONE OF THE BASIC COMPONENTS FOR MANUFACTURING THE NUCLEAR INITIATOR. IN ORDER TO PRODUCE IT, A NUMBER OF RESEARCH EXPERIMENTS WERE CONDUCTED AND DEVELOPED IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH A PLAN FOR THE CHEMICAL PROCESSES TO PRODUCE IT THROUGH IRRADIATING BISMUTH IN THE NUCLEAR REACTOR AND THEN EXTRACTING AND PURIFYING THE POLONIUM AND PRECIPITATE IT ELECTRICALLY IN ORDER TO PREPARE THE POLONIUM-210 SOURCES. THROUGHOUT THIS PERIOD A CAMPAIGN WAS CONDUCTED WHICH INCLUDED THE IRRADIATION OF 14.85 KILOGRAMS OF BISMUTH AND OBTAINING SIX MILLIGRAMS OF POLONIUM. SOME OF IT WAS USED TO CONDUCT RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT EXPERIMENTS, AND SOME OF IT WAS USED TO PREPARE FIVE SOURCES OF POLONIUM-210 IN QUANTITIES OF BETWEEN 1.25 AND 0.065 MILLIGRAMS BY ELECTROPLATING IT ONTO GOLD IN A NITRIC AND HYDROFLUORIC ACID MEDIUM, IN ORDER TO CARRY OUT THE NUCLEAR INITIATOR TESTS AND MEASUREMENTS.

2. PRODUCTION OF PLUTONIUM

THE NEED FOR THE PRODUCTION OF PLUTONIUM CALLS FOR THE PREPARATION OF SOURCES OF ALPHA EMITTERS TO SUPPORT INITIATOR TESTS AND THE NECESSARY MEASUREMENTS. IN ORDER TO PRODUCE PLUTONIUM, THE FOLLOWING WAS CARRIED OUT:

7/17

SECRET

A. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF BASIC OPERATIONS PRECEDED THE START OF WORK CAMPAIGNS TO REPROCESS SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL INCLUDING THE PROCESS OF REMOVING HIGHLY RADIOACTIVE WASTE, HOT (WORD ILLEGIBLE) ENGINEERING TESTING OF THE RADIO-CHEMICAL LABORATORY UNIT SYSTEMS WHICH ARE USED TO TREAT THE SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL. IN ADDITION, THE RADIOACTIVE WASTE WHICH ACCUMULATED IN THE RADIO-CHEMICAL LABORATORIES AND WHICH WAS PROCESSED IN THE RADIOACTIVE WASTE PROCESSING STATION WAS REMOVED. THIS WORK IS A PROCEDURE WHICH IS BEING CARRIED OUT FOR THE FIRST TIME.

B. THE REPROCESSING OF IRAQI NUCLEAR FUEL ELEMENT (EK-07) MANUFACTURED LOCALLY AND IRRADIATED IN THE TAMMUZ 14 ((JULY 14)) REACTOR. THIS RESULTED IN THE SEPARATION OF 510 MILLIGRAMS OF PLUTONIUM, AND WORK IS NOW UNDERWAY TO IMPLEMENT A CAMPAIGN TO PROCESS ANOTHER IRAQI NUCLEAR FUEL ELEMENT IRRADIATED FOR 50 DAYS INSTEAD OF THE 22 DAYS OF IRRADIATION FOR THE FIRST ELEMENT. SO FAR, 750 MILLIGRAMS OF PLUTONIUM HAVE BEEN SEPARATED AS A RESULT OF THE PROCESSING OF 12 FUEL RODS FROM THIS ELEMENT.

THE PROCESSING OF THIS TYPE OF FUEL IS BEING DONE FOR THE FIRST TIME BECAUSE IT IS MANUFACTURED LOCALLY. MOREOVER, THE RAW MATERIAL WHICH GOES INTO ITS MANUFACTURE, URANIUM DIOXIDE, IS DERIVED FROM IRAQI RAW PHOSPHATE. A SPECIAL REPORT WAS SUBMITTED TO THE PROJECT HEADQUARTERS REGARDING THIS ACHIEVEMENT. THE RESULTING PLUTONIUM CONTAINS A LARGE PERCENTAGE OF THE 239 ISOTOPE.

C. IN ADDITION, 25 MICROGRAMS OF PLUTONIUM-238 WERE PREPARED THROUGH THE IRRADIATION OF 200 MILLIGRAMS OF NEPTUNIUM-237 IN THE TAMMUZ 14 REACTOR. THEN SEPARATION OPERATIONS WERE CONDUCTED USING ANION EXCHANGE RESINS AND THE RECOVERY OF NEPTUNIUM-237 FOR THE PURPOSE OF RE-IRRADIATION. ADDITIONAL QUANTITIES OF PLUTONIUM-238 WERE EXTRACTED FOR THE PURPOSE OF PREPARING OTHER SOURCES OF ALPHA EMITTERS NEEDED FOR NUCLEAR INITIATOR TESTS.

WORK IS CONTINUING ALSO TO CONVERT PLUTONIUM

SECRET

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8/17

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COMPOUNDS RESULTING FROM THE NUCLEAR FUEL REPROCESSING INTO METAL.

3. PRODUCTION OF NATURAL URANIUM METAL.

NATURAL URANIUM METAL IS USED TO MANUFACTURE PART OF THE REFLECTOR IN THE IMPLOSION MECHANISM. IN ORDER TO PRODUCE IT, A NUMBER OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT EXPERIMENTS WERE CONDUCTED TO ESTABLISH THE CHEMICAL PROCEDURES FOR PRODUCING URANIUM TETRAFLUORIDE AS AN INTERMEDIATE MATERIAL, AND THEN URANIUM METAL. DURING THIS PERIOD, THE EQUIVALENT OF 2.2 TONS OF URANIUM TETRAOXIDE WERE PURIFIED AND CONVERTED INTO URANIUM DIOXIDE, WHICH WAS USED TO PREPARE THE EQUIVALENT OF 407 KILOGRAMS OF URANIUM TETRAFLUORIDE BY USING LABORATORY PROCEDURES. THIS MATERIAL WAS USED TO PREPARE URANIUM METAL IN THE SHAPE OF CYLINDRICAL BLOCKS. THIS WAS THEN DEVELOPED TO PREPARE THE METAL BY MEANS OF DIRECT CASTING IN THE SHAPE OF DISCS SO THAT THE EQUIVALENT OF 254 KILOGRAMS OF URANIUM METAL WERE PREPARED BY USING LABORATORY PROCEDURES ALSO.

IN THE LIGHT OF THESE RESULTS, BASIC DESIGN REPORTS WERE DRAWN UP FOR SEMI-INDISTRIAL SYSTEMS FOR THE PRODUCTION OF URANIUM TETRAFLUORIDE AND URANIUM METAL. DETAILED DESIGNS WERE SUBMITTED AND SOME OF THE SYSTEMS WERE MANUFACTURED AND INSTALLED. ([WE ARE]) AWAITING COMPLETION OF THE MANUFACTURING PROCESS AND THE INSTALLATION OF OTHER SYSTEMS AT THE AL-AMIL (?) PLANT. IN ADDITION, ALL BASIC DESIGN REPORTS FOR SIMILAR SYSTEMS WERE PREPARED AFTER SOME IMPROVEMENTS WERE MADE ON THEM, ENTAILING THE COMPLETION OF THE DETAILED DESIGNS AND MANUFACTURE OF THE SYSTEMS FOR THE PURPOSE OF PREPARING THEM TO BE INSTALLED IN THE AL-ATHIR PLANT.

IN ADDITION TO THIS, SUPPORT SYSTEMS WERE PREPARED, INCLUDING THE PROCESSING OF CHEMICAL WASTE LEFT OVER FROM THE PRODUCTION OF THESE MATERIALS. MOREOVER, REQUIREMENTS FOR QUALITY CONTROL TO EVALUATE THE MATERIALS WHICH WERE PRODUCED WERE COMPLETED.

4. PRODUCTION OF ENRICHED URANIUM METAL.

9/17

SECRET

ENRICHED URANIUM IS USED IN THE MANUFACTURE OF PART OF THE CORE IN THE IMPLOSION MECHANISM. A NUMBER OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT EXPERIMENTS WERE CONDUCTED TO PURIFY AND RECOVER THE URANIUM. BASIC DESIGN REPORTS FOR THE MANUFACTURE OF URANIUM TETRAFLUORIDE AND ENRICHED URANIUM METAL WERE DRAWN UP IN LIGHT OF THE INITIAL EXPERIMENTS USING NATURAL URANIUM.

A NUMBER OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT EXPERIMENTS WERE CONDUCTED TO PURIFY URANIUM THROUGH CHEMICAL METHODS AND ESTABLISH A PLAN FOR PROCESSES, AND DETAILED DESIGNS WERE PREPARED. THE SYSTEMS WERE MANUFACTURED SOME OF WHICH ARE NOW BEING INSTALLED; OTHERS ARE AWAITING MANUFACTURE.

5. PRODUCTION OF YELLOW CERIUM SULPHIDE

YELLOW CERIUM SULPHIDE IS CONSIDERED A PREFERRED MATERIAL FOR MANUFACTURING CRUCIBLES FOR THE MELTING AND CASTING OF URANIUM METAL. DUE TO THE DIFFICULTY OF OBTAINING IT IN THE REQUIRED QUANTITIES, A RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED TO PRODUCE THIS MATERIAL IN THE LABORATORY THROUGH THE PREPARATION OF INTERMEDIATE MATERIALS.

THROUGHOUT THIS PERIOD 10 KILOGRAMS OF YELLOW CERIUM SULPHIDE WERE PREPARED. IT WILL BE PURIFIED ONCE THE REQUIREMENTS NEEDED FOR MANUFACTURING THE PURIFICATION SYSTEM ARE MET. WORK IS CURRENTLY UNDERWAY TO MANUFACTURE THEM IN LIGHT OF THE DETAILED AND BASIC DESIGNS WHICH HAVE BEEN DRAWN UP.

MATERIALS PROGRAM

THE MATERIALS PROGRAM FORMS THE BACKBONE OF THE WORK OF THE AL-ATHIR PLANT. IT INCLUDES A STUDY OF THE SPECIFICATIONS OF THE MATERIAL BEFORE AND AFTER IT IS SUBJECTED TO PRESSURE AND HEAT EXTREMES. IT ALSO INCLUDES MEASUREMENT AND DESCRIPTION OF THIS MATERIAL. THROUGH THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THESE MISSIONS THE FOLLOWING

10/17

SECRET

ACCOMPLISHMENTS WERE ACHIEVED:

1. DETERMINATION OF THE TECHNOLOGICAL PARAMETERS, DETERMINATION OF THE EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS, AND IMPLEMENTATION OF CONTRACTS CONCLUDED WITH A NUMBER OF COMPANIES WITHIN THE MATERIALS PROGRAM.

2. IMPLEMENTATION OF A NUMBER OF ACTIVITIES IN THE FOLLOWING AREAS:

A. MELTING AND CASTING OF URANIUM METAL. THE RESULTS MADE IT POSSIBLE TO MELT AND CAST URANIUM METAL IN THE SHAPE OF RODS EACH WEIGHING 3 KILOGRAMS. THIS WAS DONE THROUGH THE DEVELOPMENT OF LABORATORY MELTING FURNACES CURRENTLY AVAILABLE. IN ADDITION, COATING RESOURCES WERE DEVELOPED WHICH ISOLATE THE METAL FROM THE CRUCIBLE MATERIAL WHICH IS BEING PRODUCED CURRENTLY. THIS IS DONE BY PROVIDING A PLASMA SPRAY SYSTEM WHICH IS CONSIDERED AN ADVANCED SYSTEM IN THIS FIELD.

B. POWDER TECHNOLOGY LINE. A NUMBER OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT EXPERIMENTS WERE CONDUCTED TO PREPARE THE NECESSARY CERAMIC MATERIAL FOR THE PRODUCTION OF CAPACITORS AND THE PRODUCTION OF RUBBER COVERS FOR USE IN THE FIELD OF "COLD BALANCED PRESSURE" (?) TECHNOLOGY.

C. A NUMBER OF TYPES OF PRESSURE SENSORS WERE PRODUCED FROM MANGANESE (?), PLASTICS AND QUARTZ FOR MEASURING PRESSURE AND VARIABLES.

D. A PROGRAM WAS DRAWN UP FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A NUMBER OF EXPERIMENTS FOR THE STUDY OF CHARACTERISTICS OF MATERIALS WHEN THEY ARE SUBJECTED TO PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE EXTREMES THROUGH THE USE OF EXPLOSIVE LENSES.

3. QUALITY CONTROL INSPECTION LABORATORIES WERE PREPARED BY PROVIDING SEVERAL PIECES OF EQUIPMENT AND ADVANCED SYSTEMS WHICH ARE USED TO CHARACTERIZE METALS AND CERAMIC MATERIALS FROM PHYSICAL, METALURGICAL AND MECHANICAL ASPECTS. A NUMBER OF PIECES OF EQUIPMENT WERE

FINISHED AND INSTALLED, THOSE WHICH WERE IMPORTED AND THOSE WHICH WERE TRANSPORTED FROM THE ORIGINAL SITE TO THE AL-ATHIR PLANT. PERSONNEL WERE ALSO TRAINED ON THE OPERATION OF THIS EQUIPMENT IN ORDER TO CONDUCT THE REQUIRED TESTS AND ANALYSES.

THE FOLLOWING IS A SUMMARY OF THE ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT AND SYSTEMS WHICH WERE RECEIVED, TRANSPORTED, INSTALLED, PUT INTO OPERATION DURING THIS PERIOD:

FIRST: SOME EQUIPMENT WAS INSTALLED IN TEMPORARY SITES, THEN DISMANTLED AND TRANSPORTED AND REINSTALLED IN THE WORK SITES; THESE INCLUDE:

- PLASMA SPRAY SYSTEM
- ELECTRONIC SCANNER AND ANALYTIC SENSORS
- PLASMA CHEMICAL ANALYSIS SYSTEM
  SINGLE X-RAY DIFFRACTION SYSTEM

SECOND: INSTALLATION OF SYSTEMS WHICH RECENTLY REACHED THE PLANT SITE DIRECTLY. THESE INCLUDE:

- MECHANICS/CHARACTERISTICS ((TESTING)) SYSTEMS
- NON-DESTRUCTIVE TEST SYSTEMS
- METALLOGRAPHY SYSTEMS
- ELECTRONIC ((SIC)) PIERCING SYSTEM
- MODEL PREPARATION EQUIPMENT

THIRD: TRANSPORTATION OF ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT AND SYSTEMS FROM THE AL-TUWAITHA SITE TO THE PLANT SITE AND THEN INSTALLED AND STARTED UP:

- MELTING AND CASTING FURNACE
- ((ONE WORD ILLEGIBLE)) FURNACE
- OPTICAL COMPARATOR
- POWDER X-RAY DIFFRACTION SYSTEM
- THERMAL ANALYSIS SYSTEMS
- SLIP CASTING SYSTEMS

FOURTH: RECEIPT OF A SET OF EQUIPMENT WHICH IS IN THE

12/17

SECRET

PROCESS OF BEING INSTALLED, AND PREPARATION OF TEMPORARY INSTALLATION SITES FOR OTHER SYSTEMS. THESE INCLUDE:

- LARGE COLD ISOSTATIC PRESS
- SMALL COLD ISOSTATIC PRESS
- SMALL HOT ISOSTATIC PRESS
- PULVERISING AND SIFTING SYSTEMS
- VAPOR COATING SYSTEMS
- DIMENSIONAL MEASURING DEVICE
- SET OF SMALL FURNACES
- SURFACE ANALYSIS SYSTEMS

TESTS:

1. DETONATION TESTS

BASIC REPORTS FOR DETONATION TESTS WERE DRAWN UP. THESE ARE BEING CONDUCTED AT SITE 100. THE REQUIREMENT NEEDS FOR THESE TESTS ARE BEING PREPARED AND 20 DETONATION TESTS HAVE BEEN CARRIED OUT BY USING EXPLOSIVE LENSES WHICH HAVE BEEN PREPARED AT AL-QA'QA' GENERAL FACILITY. THESE TESTS ARE AIMED AT MEASUREMENT OF THE HOMOGENEITY OF THE WAVE FRONT. SOME ENCOURAGING RESULTS WERE ACHIEVED IN THIS AREA. ALSO, EXPERIMENTS WERE CONDUCTED TO TEST THE INTERNAL INITIATOR MODELS USING EXPLOSIVE LENSES. IN ADDITION TO THAT, AN ELECTRONIC SYSTEM WAS DESIGNED, MANUFACTURED AND CALIBRATED WHICH IS USED TO MEASURE VERY SMALL TIME INTERVALS DURING THESE EXPERIMENTS.

2. NEUTRONIC TESTS

A LIQUID SCINTILLATION SYSTEM WAS INSTALLED AND CALIBRATED FOR MEASURING WEAK NEUTRONIC YIELD, AND MEASUREMENTS OF THE DEGREE OF URANIUM ENRICHMENT WERE MADE.

A SYSTEM WAS INSTALLED AND PUT INTO OPERATION FOR MEASURING NEUTRONS RESULTING FROM THE OXIDATION ((SIC)) OF POLONIUM-210. ALSO THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DENSE PLASMA FOCUSING LABORATORY WERE PREPARED. WORK IS CONTINUING WITHIN THE FRAME WORK OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT WITH

13/17

SECRET

THE GOAL OF USING IT IN THE FUTURE EXTERNAL INITIATOR.

3. NUCLEAR INITIATOR:

THE NUCLEAR INITIATOR FOR THE MECHANISM CONSISTS OF TWO PRINCIPAL MATERIALS, POLONIUM-210 AND BERYLLIUM, SEPARATED BY A THIN GOLD COATING. WHEN THIS COATING IS RUPTURED AS A RESULT OF THE FIRST EXPLOSION OF THE LENSES AND THE SHOCK WAVE, THE NEUTRONS ARE LIBERATED THROUGH THE INTERACTION OF THE ALPHA PARTICLES EMITTED FROM THE POLONIUM-210 WITH THE NUCLEUS OF THE BERYLLIUM ((ATOMS)). THESE NEUTRONS ARE WHAT CAUSE THE INITIATION OF THE FISSION CHAIN REACTION OF THE NUCLEI OF THE URANIUM-233. AFTER THE DESIGN CALCULATIONS WERE COMPLETED FOR DETERMINING THE NEUTRONS EMITTED FROM THE INITIATOR, SEVERAL DESIGNS FOR THIS INITIATOR WERE DRAWN UP FOR TESTING TO CHOOSE THE IDEAL ONE. IN CONNECTION WITH THESE TESTS, THE A SYSTEM FOR CALIBRATING THE INITIATOR MODEL WITHOUT NUCLEAR COMPONENTS WAS MANUFACTURED AND INSTALLED. TESTS WERE CONDUCTED WITH THE NUCLEAR COMPONENTS AND NEUTRONS WERE OBTAINED. ALSO, THE INITIAL TESTING SYSTEM WAS MANUFACTURED AND INSTALLED FOR MEASURING THE VELOCITY RANGING BETWEEN 600 AND 1000 METERS PER SECOND. IN ORDER TO OBTAIN THE MAXUMIM VELOCITY, A BASIC REPORT WAS DRAWN UP FOR THE INITIATOR MODEL TESTS ON THE HAMMER SYSTEM FOR WHICH THE CORNERSTONE WAS RECENTLY INSTALLED.

THE FINAL TESTS FOR THE INITIATOR WILL BE CONDUCTED WHEN THE LENSES AND MATERIAL FOR A MOCK CORE OF THE MECHANISM ARE MADE.

4. PRIMARY FLASH X-RAY SYSTEM (160 KV)

APPARENT CALCULATIONS FOR FIELD EMISSION WERE MADE AND ALSO DESIGNS WERE DRAWN UP FOR THE CATHODE USED IN THE SYSTEM. ALSO THE BASIC REPORT WAS PREPARED FOR THE SUPPLEMENTARY SYSTEM WHICH WAS MANUFACTURED, INSTALLED, PUT INTO OPERATION AND SUCCESSFULLY TESTED. WORK IS CONTINUING TO COMPLETE THE DESIGN AND MANUFACTURE OF THE 600 KV SUPPLEMENTARY SYSTEM WHICH CANNOT BE OBTAINED COMMERCIALLY.

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14/17

SECRET

FIRING, CONTROL AND GUIDANCE SYSTEMS:

1. SYNCHRONIZATION AND TIMING SYSTEMS

AT THE BEGINNING OF 1989 A BASIS DESIGN REPORT FOR THE SYNCHRONIZATION AND TIMING SYSTEM WAS DRAWN UP FOR PROVIDING ENERGY FOR THE DETONATOR CABLES WITHIN SPECIFIC DESIGN OPTIONS. THE DESIGNS WER MADE. THE BRANCHING CABLE DETONATOR SYSTEMS (2, 4, 8, 16, AND 32) WERE IMPLEMENTED AND BUILT IN JULY OF THE SAME YEAR. AT THE BEGINNING OF 1990 AN ADVANCED MINIATURIZED SYSTEM (REDUCED TEN TIMES IN WEIGHT AND SIZE) WAS DEVELOPED FOR 32 CABLES WEIGHING UP TO 5 KILOGRAMS. IT PROVIDES THE ENERGY WITHIN TIME VARIATIONS NOT EXCEEDING 10 NANOSECONDS. AN INTEGRATED SYSTEM FOR FOUR DETONATION CABLES WAS DELIVERED TO THE AL-QA'QA' FACILITY AND ANOTHER IS BEING USED SUCCESSFULLY IN TESTS WHICH ARE BEING CONDUCTED IN THE PLANT. THE ABOVE WORK AMOUNTED TO A SCHOOL FROM WHICH DESIGN CONCEPTS WERE DERIVED FOR TESTING HIGH-SPEED MEASURING DEVICES AND SENSORS, IN ADDITION TO DESIGNS FOR PULSE-POWER DEVICES FOR THE DENSE PLASMA FOCUS SYSTEM AND THE MARX GENERATOR FOR GENERATING SUPER-HIGH VOLTAGE PULSES IN THE FLASH X-RAY SYSTEM. THE ABOVE SYSTEMS ARE WORKING SUCCESSFULLY NOW. NOTE THAT IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO OBTAIN ANY OF THE ABOVE SYSTEMS COMMERCIALLY.

2. PULSE-POWER EQUIPMENT

PULSE-POWER EQUIPMENT WAS DESIGNED AND BUILT FOR DENSE PLASMA FOCUS SYSTEMS, WITH SPECIFICATIONS OF 10 KILOVOLTS, 300 KILOAMPERES, AT A TIME OF 1.8 MICROSECONDS, AND A MARX GENERATOR FOR GENERATING SUPER-HIGH VOLTAGE PULSES IN THE FLASH X-RAY SYSTEM, WITH SPECIFICATIONS OF 160 KILOVOLTS AND A CURRENT OF 1600 AMPERES. THESE SYSTEMS ARE NOW OPERATING SUCCESSFULLY AND THEY ARE BEING DEVELOPED TO BETTER SUIT REQUIREMENTS. NOTE THAT IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO OBTAIN ANY OF THEM COMMERCIALLY.

3. CHARGING POWER EQUIPMENT.

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CHARGING POWER EQUIPMENT WAS DESIGNED AND BUILT TO BE USED IN THE SYSTEM FOR SUPPLYING POWER TO THE DETONATION CABLES. THIS RESULTED IN THE DEVELOPMENT AND DESIGN OF MINIATURIZED POWER EQUIPMENT SYSTEM (1000 TIMES) WEIGHING 500 GRAMS AND MEETING REQUIREMENTS FOR USE. NOTE THAT IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO OBTAIN THESE SYSTEMS COMMERCIALLY.

4. JUNCTION SWITCHES

IN VIEW OF THE HIGHLY SPECIALIZED APPLICATION OF THE HIGH ENERGY PULSE JUNCTION SWITCHES A NUMBER OF JUNCTION SWITCHES WITH A SPARK GAP APPROACHING 200 KILOAMPERES AND VOLTAGE OF 50 KILOVOLTS. THE DEVELOPMENT AND MANUFACTURE OF THIS TYPE OF SWITCH MAKES UP FOR THE USE OF OTHER SWITCHES SUCH AS THE KRYTRON, WHICH CANNOT BE OBTAINED COMMERCIALLY.

5. CAPACITORS

CAPACITORS WERE DESIGNED AND BUILT THROUGH THE USE OF TWO TECHNOLOGIES, HIGH-VOLTAGE CHIP SENSORS FOR THE SYNCHRONIZATION AND TIMING SYSTEM, AND THE CERAMIC CAPACITORS WHICH ARE USED IN THE FLASH X-RAY SYSTEMS. CERAMIC CAPACITORS WERE MANUFACTURED. THE SLOW IMPORTED CAPACITORS WERE CONVERTED AND TURNED INTO HIGH-SPEED ((CAPACITORS)) AND INDUCTANCE WAS REDUCED FROM 250 TO 13 NANOHENRYS.

ALSO, 5-NANOHENRY 45-KILOVOLT DISC CAPACITORS WERE MANUFACTURED AND THEY WILL BE USED IN THE MARX GENERATOR TO REACH 600 KILOVOLTS.

6. MEASUREMENTS

THE FOLLOWING WERE DESIGNED AND CARRIED OUT:

(1) SYSTEMS FOR MEASURING CURRENT AND PULSE VOLTAGE OF SYSTEMS.

(2) SYSTEMS FOR MEASURING MINUTE SEGMENTS OF TIME FOR

16/17

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DETONATION TESTS IN INTERVALS OF BETWEEN NANO- AND MICROSECONDS WITH A HIGH DEGREE OF ACCURACY REACHING SEVERAL PICOSECONDS.

SUPPORT ACTIVITIES:

1. SYSTEMS FOR DERIVING DATA.

A NUMBER IF THESE SYSTEMS WERE CREATED TO SUPPORT TESTS IN VARIOUS PARTS OF THE PLANT. THEY COVERED PROGRAMS TO ANALYZE DATA DERIVED FROM THEORIES FOR NEUTRON INITIATOR TESTS AND THE LOW-NEUTRON BACKGROUND MEASUREMENTS USING AN ANALOG DATA BUS.

2. COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS WERE CREATED FOR THE PROJECT SITES TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THE SPECIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SITES AND GUARANTEEING COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY. THESE NETS WERE DEVELOPED THROUGH LOCAL EXPERTISE AND WITH PROJECT PERSONNEL. THEY INCLUDE SWITCHBOARDS, ((FIBER-))OPTIC AND TELEPHONE CABLES AND DIGITAL COMMUNICATIONS. NOTE THAT SOME OF THE EXPERTISE WHICH IN EMPLOYED IN THE PROJECT IS NOT AVAILABLE IN THE COUNTRY.

3. MECHANICAL DESIGNS:

DESIGNS FOR MECHANICAL SYSTEMS WERE CREATED WHICH ARE REQUIRED BY THE VARIOUS DIVISIONS OF THE PLANT TO SUPPORT THE TESTS AND PRODUCTION OPERATIONS. SOME OF THESE DESIGNS REQUIRE PRECISE OPERATING TECHNOLOGY. THEY INCLUDE:

DESIGNS FOR MODELS OF NEUTRON INITIATORS AND DESIGNS FOR INITIAL TESTING SYSTEMS FOR THE INITIATOR AND THE HAMMER, IN ADDITION TO DESIGNS FOR THE JUNCTION SWITCHES.

4. SUPPORT ACTIVITIES FOR THE PLANT SITE:

ACTIVITIES INCLUDED:

PROVIDING ENGINEERING SUPPORT FOR THE INSTALLATION AND OPERATION OF THE SERVICE SYSTEMS AND THE

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INSTALLATION OF SOME EQUIPMENT. ((LINE MISSED)) INSTALLATION AND FURNISHING A NUMBER OF TRAILERS.

TRANSFER TO NEW WORK SITE (AL-ATHIR PLANT)

IN LIGHT OF THE COMPLETION OF THE FIRST PHASE OF THE AL-ATHIR PLANT FACILITY, MOST OF THE STAFF OF THE PLANT WERE MOVED FROM THEIR DUTY POSTS IN AL-TUWAITHA TO THE NEW PLANT WORK SITE. ALSO THE EQUIPMENT, MACHINERY AND TESTING SYSTEMS WERE MOVED AND WERE INSTALLED AND PUT INTO OPERATION AT THE NEW SITE TO CONTINUE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ACTIVITIES OF THE PLAN. THE FACILITY OF THIS PHASE WAS OPENED UP BY THE MINISTER OF INDUSTRY AND MILITARY INDUSTRIALIZATION ON 7 MAY 1990. HE LOOKED OVER THE ACCOMPLISHMENTS WHICH HAD BEEN ACHIEVED DURING THE PERIOD. THE WORK IS CONTINUING TO IMPLEMENT THE SECOND PHASE OF THE FACILITY WHICH IT IS HOPED TO BE COMPLETED BY THE END OF THIS YEAR.

((END TEXT))

UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/23123
10 October 1991
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 8 OCTOBER 1991 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 8 October 1991 addressed to you by Mr. Ahmad Hussein, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Abdul Amir A. AL-ANBARI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

Letter dated 8 October 1991 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to inform you of the text of the irregular and dangerous statements made by the President of a State that occupies a permanent seat in the Security Council. On 4 October 1991, the President of the United States of America stated at a press conference that he wished to see Saddam Hussein out of power so that the United States could normalize its relations with the Iraqi people; that was his constant policy. He said that getting rid of him would be in the interest of the United States and that the embargo would continue, United Nations supervision over the marketing of Iraqi oil would continue, and no imports would be allowed except food and medicine for the Iraqi people.

These officially documented statements by the President of the United States of America conflict totally with the letter and spirit of the Charter of the United Nations. While the Charter affirms that the Security Council shall act in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations, United States President George Bush continues to affirm his policy publicly in a way that conflicts with those purposes and disregards his country's obligations as a permanent member of the Security Council not to intervene in the internal affairs of a sovereign State Member of the United Nations, threatening the security, safety and independence of Iraq.

Article 2, paragraph 7, of the United Nations Charter provides that "nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State", and Article 1, paragraph 2 of the Charter provides for "friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples".

It is truly regrettable that silence should prevail in the face of these dangerous statements by the President of a great Power and permanent member of the Security Council. Silence about such policies, which are in open contradiction to the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law, will have dire consequences for international peace and security, which form the core of the duties of the United Nations and the Security Council. Moreover, these policies which the President of the United States of America officially adopts and declares through the media constitute an extraordinary violation of Security Council resolutions, nay, contempt of the Council.

We must say that silence concerning this United States behaviour, which is being passed on through the channels of the international Organization, constitute a kind of tacit participation in it, unless the States members of the Council adopt clear positions on it.

Security Council resolution 687 (1991) did not give the right or the competence to any authority or country to intervene in the internal affairs of Iraq. Accordingly, the official position of the United States President clearly disregards not only the above-mentioned resolution but also other relevant resolutions and turns them into an instrument and means for implementing the suspect policy followed by the United States President.

The Government of the Republic of Iraq calls upon you and, through you, the other members of the Security Council to assume their responsibilities under the United Nations Charter and international law by rejecting the United States President's contemptuous disregard of all international covenants, laws and customs and the resolutions of the Security Council.

The President of the United States of America persists in intervening in the internal affairs of Iraq, in implementation of a suspect policy that seeks to subject Iraq and the Iraqi people to United States colonial tutelage, using to that end ways and means that in no way differ from the ways and means of starvation and genocide.

(Signed) Ahmad HUSSEIN
Minister for Foreign Affairs
of the Republic of Iraq

Baghdad, 8 October 1991

UNITED
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General Assembly Security Council

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A/46/547
S/23124
9 October 1991

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-sixth session
Agenda items 29 and 68
THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY
REVIEW OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE STRENGTHENING OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-sixth year

Letter dated 8 October 1991 from the Permanent Representative of Afghanistan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit to you a letter dated 2 October 1991 from His Excellency, Najibullah, President of the Republic of Afghanistan, addressed to you (see annex).

I have further the honour to request that the text of the present letter and its annex be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 29 and 68, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Khodaidad BASHARMAL
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

Letter dated 2 October 1991 from the President of Afghanistan to the Secretary-General

This is to inform you that, in recent days, specially following the joint declaration made by the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Afghanistan, the extremist segment of the opposition forces, directly instigated, encouraged and supported by the Pakistani military circles, have intensified their fighting activities against the Republic of Afghanistan, particularly in areas bordering with Pakistan. I would like to bring to your attention that, during the recent days alone, thousands of long-distance heavy rocket shellings have been carried out by the opposition forces on Gardez, Laghman and Jalalabad cities.

From the reliable information we have received, it reveals that, during the last month, a huge quantity of weapons and ammunitions have been transported from the territory of Pakistan into Afghanistan through several convoys of vehicles. These shipments are being continued with an unprecedented pace. These and other related evidences are a testimony to the reality that the opposition groups, enjoying the direct support and cooperation of certain circles in Pakistan, have resorted to fresh adventurous acts that will lead to nothing but further killings of the people and the destruction of Afghanistan.

I deem it necessary here to draw your attention to the fact that the Government of the Republic of Afghanistan was the first party to the conflict which proclaimed its full support for your five-point proposal and the recent joint statement by the United States and the Soviet Union on Afghanistan. You may be aware that, recently, we have forwarded a new initiative, i.e., the launching of elections for the local councils, which will certainly serve as a prelude to the implementation of your proposals aimed at establishing a broad-based government in Afghanistan. This initiative, which is the subject of a separate letter to you, will also serve as an important step towards an intra-Afghan dialogue.

Regrettably, however, not only has the reaction of the opposition forces and their Pakistani patrons to your proposals, the United States-Soviet statement and our peace initiatives been abstract, vague and even obstructing, but they have revealed their intention for the continuation of war and a military solution by increasing the stockpiling of weapons and intensifying war and bloodshed.

As I have clearly stated in my previous letters, I once again underline the fact that the termination of the supply of weapons by the United States and the Soviet Union to the conflicting parties in Afghanistan can lead to the restoration of peace only when the arms supply by all the resources to all the warring factions is ended and, in order to attain that aim, an effective and practical monitoring mechanism is worked out under the auspices of or in close cooperation with the United Nations.

I would like to stress that the aforementioned acts of violence being perpetrated by the opposition forces and their Pakistani benefactors will further complicate the situation and will even lead to the impediment of the already fruitful efforts aimed at ending the war and ensuring peace in our country. At this sensitive juncture of the history of our country, we once again call upon you to pay due attention to the grave situation and the awful threats posed to our country and our region as a result of the reckless deeds of the Afghan opposition and the Pakistani authorities. We hope that you will take urgent action and make every effort so as to persuade Pakistan to put an immediate end to armed attacks on Afghanistan cities and terminate the arms shipments into the territory of Afghanistan.

NAJIBULLAH
President of the Republic
of Afghanistan

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General Assembly Security Council

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9 October 1991

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-sixth session
Agenda items 29 and 68
THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY
REVIEW OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE STRENGTHENING OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-sixth year

Letter dated 8 October 1991 from the Permanent Representative of Afghanistan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit to you a letter dated 2 October 1991 from His Excellency, Najibullah, President of the Republic of Afghanistan, addressed to you (see annex).

I have further the honour to request that the text of the present letter and its annex be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 29 and 68, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Khodaidad BASHARMAL
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

Letter dated 2 October 1991 from the President of Afghanistan to the Secretary-General

For the purpose of creating favourable conditions for the implementation of your proposal submitted on 21 May 1991 aimed at a political settlement of the situation in Afghanistan, and availing ourselves of the opportunity and encouraging the international climate brought about by the joint United States-Soviet statement of 13 September 1991 on Afghanistan, we in the Republic of Afghanistan, pursuant to our previous peace proposals, have put forward a new initiative, i.e., the launching of preliminary elections for the local councils both in the areas under the control of the government and those influenced by the opposition forces.

This initiative contains a mechanism for holding preliminary elections for the local councils, in which all the parties to the conflict would be allowed to participate on a free and voluntary basis. Such elections can serve as a rehearsal for the future parliamentary elections throughout the country. The government welcomes the candidates of the opposition parties, groups and individuals in all constituencies. The government is further ready to embark on preparatory work for such elections in a joint effort with all other parties concerned. We also welcome the role and assistance of the United Nations in setting the date and conducting the elections in all its stages.

With a view to successfully launching the elections, we call upon the international community and the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, as the co-guarantors of the Geneva Agreements and the parties to the statement of 13 September 1991 on Afghanistan, to utilize their prestigious powers for inducing the opposition forces to refrain from further bloodshed and destruction of the country and to urge them instead to contribute to the restoration of peace through cooperating with the government in conducting the proposed elections.

It would not be irrelevant here to stress once again the imperative need for an international monitoring mechanism in order to verify the termination of arms supplies to Afghanistan enunciated in your proposal, as well as proclaimed by the two super-Powers. In our view, this monitoring mechanism should be arranged in such a manner that will help prevent not only arms shipments but also illicit drug trafficking. We are of the conviction that, in the event of the lack of an international monitoring mechanism, the war and bloodshed will continue to be intensified and, as a result, your proposal as well as the United States-Soviet statement on the cutoff of arms supplies will remain on paper. That will no doubt lead to the loss of credibility of the said proposal and statement not only for the people of Afghanistan but also for the whole world community.

We are well aware of the fact that your proposal, as well as the United States-Soviet statement, is aimed solely at the peaceful solution and the restoration of peace in our war-stricken country, but, regretfully, the sad reality prevailing in the field is that the increasing shipments of deadly weapons and ammunitions to Afghanistan are nowadays accompanied by modern war technology, including long-range artillery, armoured battle vehicles and combat tanks.

Such a state of affairs will certainly not only jeopardize your peace-seeking efforts and those of the peace-loving States but it will also result in further killings of our innocent people who have suffered abundantly from the agony of the bloody war going on for more than 12 years now.

It is for that reason that we appeal to you to back up and support your own good offices mission and that of the two super-Powers aimed at a comprehensive peaceful settlement of the Afghanistan issue by sparing no efforts to help in the realization of our aforementioned proposals.

NAJIBULLAH
President of the
Republic of Afghanistan